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curate estimation of a local labor market and therefore the most probative statistical evidence for establishing employment discrimination. 3
By imposing stricter burdens on the prosecution of discrimination claims
and scrutinizing statistical evidence more closely, the Fourth Circuit increased the proof required to establish the plaintiff's prima facie case.
This result, however, should help to eliminate frivolous plaintiff claims
and make employee qualifications and skills essential factors in employment decisions.
A.

VIII.

KIRKLAND MOLLOY

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
What is a Dike?

Congress enacted the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890 (1890 Act)' as
amended in 1899 (1899 Act)2 to control the proliferation of bridges and
other obstacles which impede commercial river navigation.' Sections 94
and 101 are the enforcement provisions of the Act. Section 9 prohibits
the construction of any bridge, dam, dike, or causeway over or in navigable waters6 without congressional approval.7 Under section 10, the
See text accompanying notes 31-39 & 51-62 supra.

Ch. 907, 26 Stat. 426 (1890) [hereinafter cited as 1890 Act].

2 Ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121 (1899) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467 (1976)) [hereinafter cited

as 1899 Act].
See note 37 infra (historical development of 1899 Act).
33 U.S.C. § 401 (1976).
Id § 403 (1976).
Congress has defined navigable waters as "the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1976). Courts construe "navigable waters"
to mean any body of water that was or is used for transportation and commerce or could be
suitable for such use with reasonable improvement. United States v. Appalachian Elec.
Pwr. Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407-08, 416-17 (1940); see Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 11 (1971)
(Great Salt Lake considered navigable not because involved in commerce but because used
in past as highway); cf. State Water Control Bd. v. Hoffman, 574 F.2d 191, 194 (4th Cir. 1978)
(lake not subject to federal regulations since lake solely within one state). Once deemed
navigable, a body of water will always be considered navigable regardless of whether the
body of water continues to be used for navigational purposes. 331 U.S. at 408-09. Congress'
authority over navigable waters is not limited to navigational purposes, but is "as broad as
the needs of commerce." 311 U.S. at 426 (construing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2).
33 U.S.C. § 401 (1976). Plans for structures listed in § 9 require the approval of the
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and authorization by the Secretary of the Army (Secretary). IM; see 33 C.F.R. § 325.1 (1979) (application procedure for permits), Congress
delegated to the Secretary the duty of prescribing all regulations for the use, administration, and navigation of the nation's navigable waters except in matters specifically reserved
to other executive departments. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1894, ch. 299, § 4, 28 Stat. 362
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Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) must authorize construction of any
wharfs, piers, dolphins, booms, weirs, breakwaters, or jetties or any excavation or filling of a water body.'
Courts have criticized the language of section 9 and 10 as being
unclear and ambiguous.' The Corps has not interpreted sections 9 and 10
in accordance with the plain meaning of the statutory language. Rather,
the Corps has interpreted the Act to require section 9 congressional approval only for structures which completely span a navigable waterway,
regardless of what the structure is labelled in the vernacular." Environmental groups have challenged the Corps' practice of issuing section 10 permits for dikes which do not extend across waterways, contending that the construction of any dike requires congressional approval."1 In Hart and Miller Islands Area Environmental Group, Inc. v.
(1894) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)); see National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 253, §
205, 61 Stat. 495 (1947) (Department of War title changed to Department of Army); note 56
infra (approval for construction of bridges, dams and causeways delegated to other executive departments).
' 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976). Section 10 is comprised of three clauses. The first clause prohibits any obstruction to the navigable capacity of the waters unless affirmatively authorized by Congress. Id. The second and third clauses list classes of structures or actions that
are prohibited unless conducted according to plans recommended by the Corps. Id. The
second clause requires the Corps' approval for the construction of any wharfs, piers,
dolphins, booms, weirs, breakwaters, bulkheads, or jetties. The third clause prohibits any
excavation, filling or other acts that would modify a water body without the Corps' approval. Id. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610, 628 (N.D. Cal. 1975), modified sub
nom. Sierra Club v. Andrus, 610 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1979). Although § 10 states that the
Corps' plans require the Secretary's approval, the Secretary delegated all § 10 permit
authority to the Corps. 33 C.F.R. § 322.5 (1979).
The first clause of § 10 contains the phrase "obstructions to navigable capacity." This
phrase refers to the current or future potential of a structure or object to obstruct navigation. 400 F. Supp. at 630 (N.D. Cal. 1975). The classes of structures and actions listed in the
second and third clauses of § 10 could be considered "obstructions to the navigable capacity"
and thus require congressional consent. The Supreme Court has held, however, that Congress did not intend to limit the Corps' power in the second and third clauses by the broad
language of the first clause of § 10. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 412-13 (1929). In a
later opinion, the Supreme Court held that the-Corps is not limited to authorizing permits
for obstructions listed in the second and third clauses under § 10, but has approval authority
over anything which diminishes the water's navigable capacity. United States v. Republic
Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 486-88 (1960). See generally Powers, Fox in the Chicken Coop: The
Regulatory Program of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 63 VA. L. REV. 503 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Powers].
' See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 413 (1929); Citizens' Comm. for Envt'l
Protection v. United States Coast Guard, 456 F. Supp. 101, 114-15 (D.N.J. 1978); Petterson v.
Resor, 331 F. Supp. 1302, 1306 (D. Or. 1971), dismissed as moot sub nom. Citizens Comm. for
Columbia River v. Callaway, 494 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1974); see note 39 infra (Congress' failure
to review 1899 amendments caused Act's ambiguity).
10 For judicial opinions demonstrating the Corps' interpretation of § 9 and § 10 see
Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 412-13 (1929); Petterson v. Resor, 331 F. Supp. 1302, 1306
(D. Or. 1971).
" See notes 25, 28 & 58 infra (actions where environmental groups have challenged the
Corps' issuance of § 10 permits).
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Corps of Engineers,12 the Fourth Circuit recently reviewed sections 9
and 10 of the Act and the statutory meaning of "dike." The court held
that the Corps has authority to issue section 10 permits for any construction in navigable waters so long as the structure does not completely
13
span a navigable waterway.
In 1976, the Corps issued a permit to the State of Maryland authorizing the construction of a disposal facility between Hart and Miller
Islands in the Chesapeake Bay. 4 The State of Maryland chose to locate
the facility on the eastern or bayside of the islands where the Bay is
seven miles wide." The proposed facility is rectangular, consisting of
four sea walls, one of which will connect the two islands." The facility
will extend from the islands and into the Bay approximately two miles
and thus will not completely span the Bay. 1 The purpose of the facility is
to contain spoil" from dredging operations in the Baltimore Harbor and
the Harbor's approaching channels. 9
In 1977, two environmental groups and a number of individuals
brought action against the Corps for declaratory and injunctive relief to
void the permit. 20 The plaintiffs contended that the Corps lacked author"

621 F.2d 1281 (4th Cir. 1980).

"

Id. at 1291.

Id at 1282-83.
621 F.2d 1281, 1282-84 (4th Cir. 1980).
" I& at 1284.
.
621 F.2d 1281, 1284 (4th Cir. 1980).
" Spoil dredged from the floor of the Bay contains toxic chemicals, heavy metals, oil,
grease, and other substances. Id The spoil falls under the definition of pollution under §
502(g) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1976).
Therefore the discharge of the spoil into navigable waters is subject to FWPCA regulations
under § 404. Id. at § 1344 (1976). Section 404 authorizes the Corps to issue permits for the
discharge of pollution at disposal sites specified by the Corps. Id. The purpose of containing
the Bay's spoil in a diked disposal area is to remove and destroy any pathogenic bacteria
that might be in the mud. 621 F.2d at 1284. The bacteria is destroyed through sedimentation, filtration, and the long period of time the spoil remains in the facility. Id. at 1284-85.
The dredged spoil from the Baltimore Harbor previously was dumped into the open waters
of the Chesapeake Bay, causing pollution of the Bay. Id at 1284. In 1969, the State of
Maryland realized the deleterious environmental effects caused by open water dumping and
authorized funds for the design and construction of disposal containment facilities. Id at
1284 n.5. In 1975, Maryland prohibited any discharge of spoil into the Baltimore Harbor
unless placed in disposal facilities. I&
Congress was also aware of the possible adverse effects of open water dumping of
dredged materials. Congress authorized funds for dredging the Baltimore Harbor on condition that the State of Maryland provide a Corps-approved disposal facility. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-611, § 101, 84 Stat. 1818 (1970); see 621 F.2d at 1284 n.4.
19 621 F.2d 1281, 1284-85 (4th Cir. 1980). The Baltimore Harbor required dredging to
deepen the Harbor to accommodate the entry of large cargo vessels. Hart & Miller Islands
Area Envt'l Group, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs., 459 F. Supp. 279, 281 (D. Md. 1978).
' 621 F.2d at 1283. Although the Rivers and Harbors Act does not provide for judicial
review of Corps actions expressly, one district court has granted jurisdiction to private persons under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). Citizens Comm.
"

15
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ity to issue the permit because the disposal facility constituted a "dike"
which requires section 9 congressional approval." The district court
granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, holding that the facility was a dike within the meaning of section 9 of the Act and, therefore,
22
the Corps was without authority to issue the permit.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reviewed judicial precedent to determine whether the disposal facility was subject to section 9 or 10 of the
4
Act.' The court found conflicting judicial interpretations of the sections.
Previous court decisions adopted two approaches in construing the term
"dike" under the Act. Under one approach, courts have interpreted sec25
tions 9 and 10 according to the plain meaning of the sections. The dicfor Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083, 1090-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Section 702 gives the
right of judicial review of agency action to persons aggrieved by that agency's action. 5
U.S.C. § 702 (1976). Courts that deny review reason, however, the APA is not sufficient
authority on which to grant review because the Rivers and Harbors Act does not create an
independent basis of jurisdiction that would allow judicial review of agency action.
Loveladies Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Raab, 430 F. Supp. 276, 281 (D.N.J. 1975), affd, 547
F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1976); accord Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104-107 (1977) (APA does
not provide courts with independent basis of jurisdiction). For further examples of denials
of judicial review under the Rivers and Harbors Act see Red Star Towing & Transp. Co. v.
Department of Transp., 423 F.2d 104, 105-06 (3d Cir. 1970); Citizens' Comm. for Envt'l Protection v. United States Coast Guard, 456 F. Supp. 101, 112 (D.N.J. 1978). See generally
Note, JurisdictionTo Review FederalAdministrative Action: District Court or Court of
Appeals, 88 HARV. L. REv. 980 (1975).
" 459 F. Supp. 279, 283 (D. Md. 1978).
21 Id. at 291.
- 621 F.2d 1281, 1285-87 (4th Cir. 1980).
24 Id. at 1287.
1 Hart and Miller Islands Area Envt'l Group, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 459 F. Supp.
279, 284 (D. Md. 1978); Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610, 626-27 (N.D. Cal. 1975);
Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083, 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1969),
affd, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cerL denied sub nom. Parker v. Citizens Comm. for Hudson
Valley, 400 U.S. 949 (1970). In Hudson Valley, two conservation groups and an unincorporated village brought action against the Corps because the plaintiffs opposed the construction of an expressway. The plaintiffs contended that the Corps exceeded its authority
by issuing a § 10 permit for the construction of a dike as part of the expressway project. 302
F. Supp. at 1087. The New York district court construed § 9 according to its plain meaning,
and held that the "dike" required § 9 congressional approval since Congress expressly retained approval power over "any dike" that is "over or in" navigable waters. Id. at 1088-89.
In SierraClub, two environmental groups and two individuals challenged the validity
of the Corps' issuance of a § 10 permit. The Corps issued the permit to allow construction of
a canal for the California Water Project. The plaintiffs contended that since the canal would
completely dam the river, the canal constituted a dike under the dictionary definition and
thus required congressional approval. Sierra Club V. Morton, 400 F. Supp. at 626-27. The
Sierra Club court, relying on Hudson Valley, determined that the canal requires § 9 approval under either of two alternative plain meaning constructions of the sections. Id. at
607. First, the district court determined that because the "canal" will have the effect of a
"dike" and because the structure is "in" the river, the canal is the type of structure that requires § 9 congressional approval. Id. Second, the court reasoned that Congress used the
word "any" in § 9 to reserve the power to determine whether a particular structure is an
unreasonable obstruction to navigation. Id. The Sierra Club court held that the canal was
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tionary defines a "dike" as any embankment that holds back or controls
waters in oceans or rivers.2 Courts following the plain meaning approach
hold that "any dike" requires congressional approval since the structure
is "over or in" navigable watersY
Under the second approach, courts have adopted the Corps' administrative interpretation of the Act which requires section 9 congressional
approval only for structures that completely span navigable waterways. 8 The courts have observed that the Corps' interpretation of sections 9 and 10 has been historically consistent.' As a general rule, courts
have placed great emphasis on an agency's consistent interpretation of a
statute to determine the proper construction of an ambiguous statute.2
subject to § 9 congressional approval under either construction of the section since the canal
would completely obstruct navigation. Id.
Although the Sierra Club court construed § 9 and § 10 according to the plain meaning
of the statutory language, the court's interpretation of the sections is consistent with the
Corps' interpertation. The Corps contends that § 9 congressional approval is required only
for structures that obstruct navigation by completely spanning waterways. See note 28 infra (decision upholding Corps' interpretation of § 9 and § 10).
2 Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083, 1089 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) (citing RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 403 (2d ed. 1976)).
' Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610, 626-27 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Citizens Comm. for
the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083, 1088-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
, Citizens' Comm. for Envt'l Protection v. United States Coast Guard, 456 F. Supp.
101, 114-15 (D.N.J. 1978); Petterson v. Resor, 331 F. Supp. 1302, 1306 (D. Or. 1971). In Petterson, individuals owning property on or near the riverfront of the Columbia River challenged
a proposed airport expansion that involved placing fill in the river. 331 F. Supp. at 1303. The
plaintiffs alleged that the Corps lacked authority to authorize a fill project for the extension
of a runway, because the fill constituted a dike within the meaning of § 9 and thus required
congressional approval. 331 F. Supp. at 1303-04. The Petterson court looked to the
legislative history of the Act and determined that the Corps' interpretation of § 9 and § 10
was consistent with Congress' intent to prevent unreasonable obstruction to navigation. Id
at 1306. The Oregon district court upheld the Corps' issuance of a § 10 permit for the fill. Id.
The Petterson court determined that the fill was not a "dike" under § 9 because the structure did not completely span the river and did not obstruct navigation. Id.
In Citizens' Committee, environmentalists challenged the Corps' authority to issue a §
10 permit for the placing of fill in a river. 456 F. Supp. at 111. The project required fill for
the construction of a highway. Id. at 105. The plaintiffs alleged that the fill constituted a
dike according to the dictionary definition, and, therefore, required congressional consent
under § 9. Id. at 113. The New Jersey district court rejected the plain meaning construction
of § 9 and § 10. Id. Relying on Petterson, the court instead determined that the congressional intent of the Act is to prevent unreasonable obstruction to navigation. Id. Since the
"dike's" effect on navigation in the Citizens' Committee action was negligible, the district
court held that the Corps properly issued a § 10 permit for the fill project. Id. at 113-14. See
generally Comment, Dikes and Causeways in Navigable Waters: The Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899 and Its Conflicting Interpretations in Citizens Committee for the Hudson
Valley v. Volpe and Petterson v. Resor [1972] 2 ENVT'L REP. (ELI) 10019.
1 Citizens' Comm. for Envt'l Protection v. United States Coast Guard, 456 F. Supp.
101, 114-15 (D.N.J. 1978); Petterson v. Resor, 331 F. Supp. 1302, 1306 (D. Or. 1971).
1 E.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 382 (1969); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 413 (1929); United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 205 (1926); Swendig
v. Washington Water Pwr. Co., 265 U.S. 322, 331 (1924).
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Moreover, courts that apply the Corps' interpretation have concluded
that the Act's legislative history supports the Corps' construction of sections 9 and 10.1
The Fourth Circuit, finding the conflicting judicial precedent indicative of the ambiguity of sections 9 and 10, chose to adopt the Corps'
interpretation."2 In reaching its decision, the Fourth Circuit relied heavily on the Supreme Court's opinion in Wisconsin v. Illinois.3 The Wisconsin Court found the language of sections 9 and 10 ambiguous and consequently stressed the importance of the Corps' interpretation in construing the sections.' The Wisconsin action, however, did not involve the
statutory interpretation of "dike." Rather, the issue raised in Wisconsin
was whether the Corps had authority to authorize the diversion of water
from Lake Michigan into a nearby river under section 10.1 Thus, the
Fourth Circuit had to examine the legislative history of the Act to determine whether the Corps' interpretation of sections 9 and 10 was consistent with congressional intent. 6
The 1890 Act gave the Corps full authority to approve, deny, or alter
any structure that might obstruct navigation or the navigable capacity
of the waters.' The 1899 Act removed the Corps' authority to issue a

",Citizens' Comm. for Envt'l Protection v. United States Coast Guard, 456 F. Supp.
101, 114-15 (D.N.J. 1978); Petterson v. Resor, 331 F. Supp. 1302, 1306 (D. Or. 1971).
621 F.2d at 1287.
Id at 1285, 1287-90 citing Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1928).
278 U.S. at 413.
Id at 409-10. In Wisconsin v. Illinois, six states sought injunctive relief to prohibit
the diversion of water from Lake Michigan into the Chicago River. Id. at 399. The plaintiffs
challenged the validity of the Corps' issuance of a § 10 permit for the diversion, arguing that
the subsequent lowering of the lake's water level constituted an obstruction to navigation
which requires congressional consent. Id. at 410-11. The Court recognized that Congress intended to prohibit unreasonable obstructions to navigation and the navigable capacity of the
water. Id at 413. The Court reasoned, however, that having listed specific structures in § 9
that require congressional consent, Congress authorized the Corps to determine what
classes of cases listed in the second and third clauses of § 10 are an unreasonable obstruction. Id at 412-13. The Wisconsin Court upheld the Corps' interpretation of § 10 and the
Corps' issuance of a permit authorizing the diversion of the water. Id. at 413-14.
621 F.2d at 1287-89.
" Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890, ch. 907, § 7, 26 Stat. 426, 454 (1890); see note 8 supra
(definition of "obstructions to navigable capacity"). Prior to 1890, the railroads and other
groups built bridges over navigable rivers without the consent of Congress. See 21 CONG.
REc. 8603 (1890) (remarks of Senator Vest). These bridges sometimes created obstructions
to navigation. Id. Congress' only avenue to challenge the continued existence or compel the
restructuring of these bridges was through public nuisance actions. See Pennsylvania v.
Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 621, 630-34 (1851) (challenging existence
of bridge on Ohio River as obstruction to navigation). Congress, however, considered
nuisance actions ineffective, given the lack of private citizens willing to bring actions at
their own expense. See 21 CONG. REC. 8603 (1890) (remarks of Senator Vest).
An 1888 Supreme Court decision, Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1
(1888), spurred Congress into enacting the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation bill, later
known as the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890. In Willamette, the Supreme Court held that,
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permit when the structure is a bridge, dike, dam, or causeway. 8 The
Fourth Circuit found nothing in the Act's legislative history to explain
Congress' curtailment of the Corps' authority. 9 The court reasoned,
however, that Congress had reacted to two federal district court opinions, United States v. Keokuk & H. Bridge Co.4" and United States v.
Rider," which were delivered prior to passage of the 1899 Act.42 The
Keokuk and Rider courts intimated that Congress could not constitutionally delegate authority to approve bridges.43 The Fourth Circuit in
Hart and Miller Islands opined that the Keokuk and Rider decisions

absent congressional legislation to the contrary, states had the authority to approve or prohibit the construction of structures in navigable waters, regardless of whether the structure
obstructed navigation. 125 U.S. at 12. Congress passed the 1890 Act prohibiting any
obstructions to navigation without the permission of the Secretary of War unless the
obstruction was "authorized by law." 1890 Act, supra note 2, § 10.
Despite the fact that the 1890 Act gave the Secretary complete authority over the construction of structures in navigable waters, Congress continued to pass bills authorizing the
construction of bridges. See, e.g., Act of July 23, 1894, ch. 153, 28 Stat. 119 (1894) (authorizing construction of bridge across Mississippi River); Act of May 28, 1896, ch. 258, 29 Stat.
190 (1896) (authorizing construction of bridge across Tallahatchie River). In 1896, Congress
ordered the Secretary of War to compile the bridge bills and other laws relating to navigation. Act of June 3, 1896, ch. 314, § 2, 29 Stat. 202 (1896). The Secretary complied and the
resulting draft became the River and Harbors Act of 1899. 1899 Act, supra note 2. See
Hankey, Sections 9 & 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899: The Erosion of Administrative Control By Environmental Suits, 1980 DUKE L.J. 170, 174-81 [hereinafter cited
as Hankeyl (legislative and judicial development of § 9 and § 10); Powers, supra note 8, at
505-09 (history of Act).
- 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1976); see note 37 supra (historical development of Act).
" 621 F.2d at 1288. The ambiguity in the legislative history of § 9 and § 10 was the
result of Congress' failure to review the 1899 amendments to the Act. See 621 F.2d at 1288;
Hankey, supra note 37, at 180-81. The bill's sponsor acknowledged only slight alterations
from the 1890 Act in the 1899 amendments, whereupon Congress determined that there was
no need to read the amendments aloud. See 32 CONG. REC. 2296-97 (1899) (remarks of Senator Frye). The 1899 amendments, however, contained significant changes. Prior to the 1899
amendments, the 1890 Act gave the Corps full approval powers over the construction of
structures in navigable waters. 1890 Act, supra note 1, § 7. The 1890 Act also prohibited any
obstruction to the navigable capacity of the waters unless authorized by law. 1890 Act,
supra note 1, § 10. The 1899 Act limited the Corps' structure approval powers to specific
structures. 1899 Act, supra note 2, § 10. Further the 1899 Act altered the phrase "affirmatively authorized by law" in the 1890 Act to "affirmatively authorized by Congress" for
structures listed in § 9 of the 1899 Act. Id. at § 9; see text accompanying notes 40-41 infra
(Fourth Circuit's opinion of Congress' reasons for amending 1890 Act). For a description of
the changes in the 1899 Act from the 1890 Act see Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 412-13
(1929); Hankey, supra note 37, at 180-81.
O 45 F. 178 (S.D. Iowa 1891).
" 50 F. 406 (S.D. Ohio 1892), appeal denied, 163 U.S. 132 (1896), rev'd, 178 U.S. 251
(1900).
42 621 F.2d at 1288-89.
4 United States v. Rider, 50 F. 406, 410 (S.D. Ohio 1892); United States v. Keokuk & H.
Bridge Co., 45 F. 178, 183 (S.D. Iowa 1891). Both the Keokuk and Rider courts held that the
Secretary could not order the removal of congressionally authorized bridges. 50 F. at 408-10,
45 F. at 183.
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prompted Congress to retain section 9 approval power over structures
completely spanning navigable waters." Therefore, the Fourth Circuit
found the Corps' interpretation of sections 9 and 10 reasonable.4"
The Fourth Circuit stressed that as a general rule courts defer to an
agency's interpretation of a statute if Congress charged that agency
with administration of the statute and the agency's interpretation is rational.46 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit determined that since the Corps is
responsible for administering the Act and because the Corps' construction is a rational interpretation of sections 9 and 10, the Corps' interpretation of the Act deserved deference." The Fourth Circuit found the
Corps' interpretation entitled to particular deference because the Corps
was involved intimately in drafting the 1899 Act48 and had interpreted
sections 9 and 10 consistently for over eighty years.49 Moreover, the
court reasoned that because Congress never interfered with the Corps'
practice of assuming approval authority for all structures that do not
span navigable waters, Congress indirectly approved the Corps' interpretation. 0
The Fourth Circuit also reasoned that Congress implicitly sanctioned
the Corps' practice of issuing permits for diked disposal facilities by

" 621 F.2d at 1288-89. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that Congress relied on the
Keokuk and Rider district courts' dicta which expressed the opinion that Congress' delegation of bridge approval authority was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
621 F.2d at 1288; see note 43 supra (Keokuk and Rider holdings). The Fourth Circuit determined that in response to the dicta, Congress removed the Corps' bridge approval authority
as well as the Corps' authority over other structures that completely span waterways such
as dikes, dams and causeways. 621 F.2d at 1288-89; see Petterson v. Resor, 331 F. Supp.
1302, 1306 (D. Or. 1977) (Congress' reliance on Keokuk and Rider dicta); Powers, supra note
8, at 507 (discussing Congress' reliance on Keokuk and Rider dicta); cf Sisselman v. Smith,
432 F.2d 750, 753-54 (3d Cir. 1970) (Congress delegated all bridge approval authority to
Secretary of Transportation and did not reserve congressional supervisory powers over
bridges previously approved by Congress); note 56 infra (Congress delegated all bridge and
causeway approval authority to Department of Transportation in 1966).
'5 621 F.2d at 1289.
48 Id. at 1290; see Red Lion Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969) (agency interpretation of statute entitled to deference); cf. National Resource Defense Council, Inc. v.
Berklund, 609 F.2d 553, 557-58 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (court refused to defer to Secretary of Interior's interpretation of statute because past administrative interpretation inconsistent).
',621 F.2d at 1290.
48 Id. at 1290; see note 37 supra (Secretary of War drafted 1899 Act).
" 621 F.2d at 1290. For other decisions construing the Corps' consistent interpretation
of the Act as support for deferring to the Corps' interpretation of the Act see Wisconsin v.
Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 413 (1929); Citizens' Comm. for Envt'l Protection v. United States
Coast Guard, 456 F. Supp. 101, 114-15 (D.N.J. 1978); Petterson v. Resor, 331 F. Supp. 1302,
1306 (D. Or. 1971).
1 621 F.2d at 1291. In Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472, 483 (1963), the Supreme Court
held that because Congress had not interfered with an agency's administrative practice, the
Court could assume that Congress considers the practice consistent with the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920.
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passage of legislation subsequent to the 1899 Act." The court noted that
section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act authorizes the
Corps to issue permits for discharge of dredged or fill material 2 at
disposal sites chosen by the Corps. 3 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit determined that in the 1970 legislation authorizing the dredging of the
Baltimore Harbor, Congress strongly indicated that further congressional approval was not needed for a diked disposal facility to contain
the Harbor's dredged materials. 4
The Fourth Circuit's decision to adopt the Corps' interpretation of
sections 9 and 10 is rational. The Corps' consistent interpretation of the
Act coupled with the court's observation that Congress has not interfered with the Corps' application of sections 9 and 10 provides a
strong basis for the Fourth Circuit to defer to the Corps' construction of
the sections. Nevertheless, the plain meaning approach is also rational.
As a general practice, courts have construed statutes by applying the ordinary meaning to the statutory language.'5 Neither approach, however,
resolves the ambiguity of sections 9 and 10. Thus, Congress should
amend the Act to clarify the meaning of these sections.
Congressional legislation enacted subsequent to the 1899 Act provides afurther reason for Congress to amend sections 9 and 10. Since
passing the 1899 Act, Congress has delegated its approval powers for
bridges, causeways, and dams to the Corps and Secretary of Transportation. 6 The delegation of the majority of Congress' section 9 approval
" 621 F.2d at 1290.
52 According the Corps, "dredged materal" is material "that is excavated or dredged
from waters of the United States." 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(k) (1979). "Fill material" is any material
used to raise the bottom elevation of a waterbody, including raising the bottom until it
becomes dry land. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(m) (1979).
621 F.2d at 1290 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1976)). Congress enacted the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) to restore the nation's waters to and maintain them in their
natural state. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-500, § 101, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. II 1978));
see note 18 supra (§ 404 applied to dredging operations of Baltimore Harbor). Although Congress indicated approval of diked disposal facilities by passing § 404(a) of the FWPCA, construction of diked facilities for the containment of dredged materials still requires § 9 or §
10 approval. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (1979). The Fourth Circuit reasoned, however, that diked
disposal areas under § 404(a) do not require specific congressional approval. 621 F.2d at
1290. The court cited remarks of Representative Vanik and Senator Muskie in the Congressional Record that demonstrated that Congress encouraged the Corps to issue permits for
diked disposal facilities in order to end open water dumping. Id
' Id. at 1290-91; see note 18 supra (legislation authorizing dredging of Baltimore Harbor).
. E.g., Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1975);
Browder v. United States, 312 U.S. 335, 338 (19411; United States v. American Trucking
Assoc., Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940).
' See Federal Power Act of 1920, ch. 285, § 4(e), 41 Stat. 1063 (1920) (codified at 16
U.S.C § 797(e) (1976)); Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, § Q(g)(3), (6), 80
Stat. 931 (1966) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1655(g)(3), (6) (1976)). The construction of bridges,
causeways, and dams no longer requires congressional approval. Under the Federal Power

